
Robust Spatial-Temporal Incident Prediction

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Abstract

Spatio-temporal incident prediction is a central issue in law enforcement, with applications in fighting crimes like poaching, human trafficking, illegal fishing, burglaries and smuggling. However, state of the art approaches fail to account for evasion in response to predictive models, a common form of which is spatial shift in incident occurrence. We present a general approach for incident forecasting that is robust to spatial shifts. We propose two techniques for solving the resulting robust optimization problem: first, a constraint generation method guaranteed to yield an optimal solution, and second, a more scalable gradient-based approach. We then apply these techniques to both discrete-time and continuous-time robust incident forecasting. We evaluate our algorithms on two different real-world datasets, demonstrating that our approach is significantly more robust than conventional methods.

1 Introduction

The increase in availability of data and algorithmic progress has created new ways of fighting illegal activities like poaching, illegal logging, illegal fishing, terrorist acts and smuggling. Predictive analytics and data-driven methods have been developed to understand where such incidents could potentially happen, with spatial-temporal incident prediction a major part of this literature [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6]. Mukhopadhyay et al. [7] provide a comprehensive review of prior work in this domain. However, a significant limitation of existing incident prediction methods is that they do not account for

changes in the behavior of the perpetrator in response to the predictive models. Indeed, people with the malicious intent of committing crimes can potentially alter their behavior in response to patrols based on static predictive models, effectively resulting in spatial shifts in the resulting incidents [8, 9, 10].

Our goal is to create an algorithmic framework for forecasting spatial-temporal incidents that is robust to spatial manipulations by agents trying to commit unlawful acts. We seek to identify the vulnerabilities in existing prediction models, create an approach for capturing adversarial actions and finally develop a robust prediction model against such actions. Instead of focusing on a specific model of incident arrival, we create a general approach that is flexible to accommodate both continuous-time and discrete-time prediction models. We only assume a convex likelihood function over incident arrival, and model the interaction between the learner and the attacker as a Stackelberg game. In our model, the learner chooses a patrol strategy and the attacker chooses to manipulate its behavior in response to the chosen strategy. Such a problem falls under the paradigm of adversarial learning, which studies the effect of adversarial influence on machine learning models [11, 12, 13]. Adversarial learning has been successfully used in many domains, and it has been used recently to combat implicit biases and imperfections in crime prediction methodologies [14]. However, to the best of our knowledge, models specifically aimed to tackle manipulation in agent behavior to respond to forecasting models have not been explored, and we aim to bridge this gap.

The proposed game-theoretic model involving a learner and an attacker poses two major challenges: a) the resulting optimization problem is intrinsically difficult to solve due to the nested hierarchy of the attacker’s and defender’s optimization problems, and b) the set of adversarial strategies is combinatorial. We explain how these specific challenges manifest themselves, and develop techniques for addressing them.

*The abbreviation CRCS stands for the Center for Research on Computation and Society.

Contributions: 1) A general Stackelberg game model for robust incident prediction accounting for adversarial spatial crime shifts; 2) an approach based on dynamic constraint generation that computes an optimal leader strategy in the Stackelberg game; 3) a gradient-based algorithm that trades-off optimality and scalability; 4) application of the proposed approach to both discrete-time (Poisson regression and logistic regression) as well as continuous-time (survival analysis) incident prediction models; and finally, 5) evaluation of the proposed approach, demonstrating that it is significantly more robust to adversarial manipulation than conventional methods.

2 Model

We consider a set of spatial cells G , that spans the entire spatial area under consideration. Let $g_i \in G$ denote the i th cell. Suppose that a sequence of incidents occurs over this area, generated according to some unknown distribution, resulting in a dataset of incidents, $D_{seq} = \{(t_1, \ell_1, w_1), (t_2, \ell_2, w_2), \dots, (t_n, \ell_n, w_n)\}$, where each incident d_i is identified by its time t_i , location ℓ_i (mapping to a cell in G), and a vector of spatio-temporal features $w_i \in \mathbb{R}^m$, capturing, for example, weather, proximity to liquor stores, and any other potential determinants of crime. This dataset serves as a proxy for a future *baseline* distribution of incidents (i.e., distribution if we follow the specific policy that was implemented at the time the data was collected).

We assume that crime incidents are stochastic, and therefore associate incidence of these with a random variable X , the nature of which depends on the particular model of crime prediction. For example, in discrete-time models, X will capture the number of incidents over a fixed time interval, whereas in continuous-time models X will be the inter-arrival time between incidents. We use X to transform our dataset into an *input* dataset $D = \{(w_i, x_i)_i\}$ of incident features w_i and associated observation x_i (e.g., crime count).

Suppose that a crime prediction model entails a likelihood function $F(x; \theta, w)$ representing the likelihood of observation x given features w , with θ being the model parameters. We assume that F is convex in θ . A conventional approach to crime prediction is to learn parameters θ that maximize the likelihood of observed data D :

$$\theta^* \in \arg \max_{\theta} \prod_i F(x_i; \theta, w).$$

Typically, for computational convenience this is transformed into maximizing log-likelihood:

$$\max_{\theta} \sum_i \log F(x_i; \theta, w) \equiv \sum_i f(x_i; \theta, w), \quad (1)$$

where $f(x_i; \theta, w) = \log F(x_i; \theta, w)$. Subsequently, we refer to f as both the (log)-likelihood function and the incident prediction model to streamline exposition. Later, as we tackle the specific applications, these will be distinct.

Attacker Model: Spatial-temporal incident prediction is commonly a part of a broader strategy of response or prevention by law enforcement, with the typical net result that spatio-temporal patrols are more concentrated in the areas of higher criminal activity. This, in turn, incentivizes potential perpetrators of crimes, such as poachers, to move to other, less actively patrolled areas, to reduce the likelihood of being caught. Our specific model of spatial crime shift is based on two fundamental theories that govern crime occurrence. The first is the opportunity theory of crime [15, 16], which posits that crime locations are deliberate choices by criminals driven by their attractiveness based on a specific utility function. This motivates our consideration of spatial crime shift. The second is the crime clustering theory [17, 18], which posits that opportunities for similar crimes are often clustered and occur close to each other. This motivates another feature of our model: even if there is an incentive for attackers to deviate from their ideal locations, they are also averse to moving too far away, and may indeed be deterred in committing a crime if nearby opportunities do not present themselves. The net result of such *evasion* behavior, that is effectively in response to the incident prediction model f , is a spatial shift in crime incidents.




Figure 1: An illustration of spatial shifts by attackers to evade a learned model.

We capture the attacker’s behavior by *simulating* how the attacker would transform the input dataset D in response to a learned function f . To capture the idea that spatial shifts remain in close proximity to the baseline crime location, consider a particular incident d_i such that $\ell_i = g_k$ (say). Let N_k be the set of *neighboring* cells of g_k . This neighborhood structure can be exogenously specified for the spatial area of interest G ; we consider some examples of this in our experiments later. Our model of the attacker is that they are able to shift the incident in space from g_k to any of its neighboring locations N_k . Thus, supposing that N_k includes g_k (since the attacker could potentially choose to not shift the incident), the attacker can choose a new location of crime incident d_i to be any-

where in N_k , as illustrated in Figure 1. We capture this shift by the variable $s_i^j \in \{0, 1\}$, which denotes the attacker’s decision to shift incident d_i to cell g_j . Let s be the collection of spatial shifts chosen by the attacker for all the incidents in our dataset. The attacker’s objective is to minimize the *predicted* likelihood, i.e., likelihood of incidents in the chosen location s given a fixed model f . Formally, the attacker aims to solve the following optimization problem:

$$\min_{s \in S} \sum_i f(x_i(s); \theta, w), \quad (2)$$

where we make explicit that the attacker’s spatial shifts alter the predicted likelihood f by modifying the observed incident characteristics $x_i(s)$, and where S is the set of all possible spatial shifts over all incidents. Note the combinatorial structure of the attacker’s optimization problem in having to consider all possible joint incident shifts S . This complexity arises because the impacts of shifts on the likelihood are not necessarily independent (e.g., features w may depend on prior incidents; inter-arrival times between incidents in a given location are changed when a single incident is moved to a different location). We will address it below.

Defender Model: The learner’s (defender’s) goal is to learn a model f that is robust to adversarial shifts in incidents according to the model above. We formalize it as a robust likelihood maximization problem:

$$\max_{\theta} \min_{s \in S} \sum_i f(x_i(s), \theta; w). \quad (3)$$

We can equivalently view the model in Equation 3 as a Stackelberg game in which the leader is the learner who commits to a model θ , and the follower is the adversary who first observes the model θ and then shifts incident locations in response.

3 Approach

The optimization problem (3) is difficult to solve for a few reasons. First, the attacker optimization problem involves discrete decisions, making it difficult to deal with the bi-level nature of the problem. Second, the attacker problem is combinatorial. We propose two general approaches to solve the proposed problem.

3.1 RSALA : Robust Spatial-Temporal Predictions with Linear Attacks

In the first approach, we frame the attacker’s problem as a linear optimization problem with an exponential number of variables. Note that each attacker action (a specific

choice of s) results in a different modification to the set of incidents, resulting in a new collection of incidents with altered spatial locations. We refer to each such resulting *unique* set of incidents as a *chain*. In essence, a specific collection of shifts $s \in S$ results in a particular chain. We can then think of the attacker’s full (combinatorial) action space as the set of all such chains — that is, the set of all possible manipulations to the original dataset. Let there be a total of c such chains. The attacker’s objective thus reduces to choosing the chain that results in the lowest likelihood given the model f , which can be represented as

$$\min_{\lambda} \sum_{i=1}^c \lambda_i f_i(x; \theta, w) \quad (4a)$$

$$\text{s.t. } \sum_{i=1}^c \lambda_i = 1 \quad (4b)$$

$$\lambda_i \in \{0, 1\} \quad \forall i \in \{1, \dots, c\} \quad (4c)$$

where $f_i(x; \theta, w)$ denotes the likelihood of incidents in the i th chain, and λ is a binary variable which is set to 1 only for the chain that the attacker chooses. The obvious issue with this formulation is that c could be extremely large, making the problem intractable. We can address this issue by looking at the dual of problem 4. First, we point out that the attacker can only choose multiple chains as part of an optimal solution if they contribute the same utility to the attacker’s objective. This crucial insight lets us relax the integrality constraint over λ without sacrificing the utility of the attacker, converting problem (4) into a linear program. Then, due to strong duality, we can directly replace the attacker’s objective function in problem (3) with its dual, and represent the overall robust likelihood maximization problem as

$$\max_{\theta, \delta} \quad (5a)$$

$$\text{s.t. } \delta - f_i(x, \theta; w) \leq 0 \quad \forall i \in \{1, \dots, c\} \quad (5b)$$

$$\delta \in \mathbb{R}, \quad \theta \in \mathbb{R}^m \quad (5c)$$

where $\delta \in \mathbb{R}$ represents the dual variable.

This formulation has two important advantages: first, it converts the *max-min* hierarchy of problem (3) into a single convex maximization problem, and secondly, it puts the potentially large number of possible attacker actions into a collection of constraints. This, in turn, allows us to solve the problem using constraint generation. A constraint generation approach starts with a subset of the attacker actions, and iteratively updates the model by dynamically generating constraints according to actions taken by the attacker in response to the defender’s strategy.

While such an approach makes our algorithm comparatively tractable, the attacker problem is still combinato-

rial. We use a crucial insight to tackle this. Consider the primary consequence of the attacker’s actions: choosing a location of crime effectively changes the overall likelihood of the learned model. However, making such a decision *optimally* is unrealistic from an attacker’s perspective, since it would require the attacker to be effectively clairvoyant (they have to account for time of incidents that have not occurred). Consider for example, the attacker choosing to evade detection by minimizing the likelihood of a discrete-time regression model f based on Poisson regression. While it tries to shift incident d_i from cell g_k to g_j (say), it must account for other incidents that could potentially happen in both the cells in the same time-step. This is clearly unreasonable, since in practice attackers cannot account for incidents that have not yet happened. We therefore simplify the attack model: at any point in time t , we restrict the attacker to minimize the likelihood of the model for all incidents $d_k \in D$ such that $t_k \leq t$, since at this time, the attacker can only have information about incidents that have happened before t . This assumption dramatically reduces the complexity of the inner problem, since now the attacker’s objective is reduced to an optimization problem over a finite set of cells. The attacker can shift each incident to the cell that results in lowest likelihood, without considering how such a decision can potentially affect future incidents. We use these insights, and present our approach based on constraint generation in Algorithm 1.

Algorithm 1 RSALA

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1: INPUT: Dataset  $D$ , Likelihood Model  $f$ , Adversarial Utility function  $A$ 
2: OUTPUT: Robust model parameters  $\theta^*$ 
3: Set  $\theta^0 \leftarrow \operatorname{argmax}_{\theta} f(x; \theta, w)$ ;  $k \leftarrow 0$ ; Constraint set  $\phi^0 \leftarrow \operatorname{Attack}(\theta^0)$ ;  $gap \leftarrow \infty$ 
4: while  $gap > \epsilon$  do
5:    $\theta^{k+1} \leftarrow \operatorname{Solve}(\phi^k)$ 
6:    $\phi^{k+1} \leftarrow \phi^k \cup \operatorname{Attack}(\theta^{k+1})$ 
7:    $D^{k+1} \leftarrow \operatorname{Update}(D^k, \operatorname{Attack}(\theta^{k+1}))$ 
8:    $gap \leftarrow f^{D^{k+1}}(\theta^{k+1}) - f^{D^{k+1}}(\theta^k)$ 
9:    $k \leftarrow k + 1$ 
10: return  $\theta^{k+1}$ 

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We explain some notation before explaining the algorithm. We use A to denote the attacker’s objective function from formulation 2. At any iteration k of the algorithm, we refer to the current set of constraints by ϕ^k , the defender’s parameters by θ^k , and the dataset used in iteration k by D^k (which gets updated according to the actions taken by the attacker). Further, we use $\operatorname{Solve}(\phi^k)$ to denote solving problem 5 under constraints ϕ^k , and use $\operatorname{Attack}(\theta^i)$ to denote the generation of the attacker’s best response against θ^i . Also, we use $\operatorname{Update}(D^k, y)$

to denote a function that updates the existing dataset with manipulations generated as a response to a specific choice of θ made by the defender (thereby arriving at a new dataset D^{k+1}), and use $f^{D^k}(\theta)$ as a shorthand for $\sum_{d_i \in D^k} f(x_i; \theta, w)$.

Now, at iteration k in the algorithm, we first compute the defender’s optimal parameters θ^{k+1} by solving problem 5 under constraints ϕ^k (step 5). We then update the constraint set by computing the attacker’s best response to θ^{k+1} (step 6). Such a response is straight-forward to compute, due to the relaxed version of the attacker’s problem mentioned above. The attacker’s response is then used to update the dataset (step 7), which is then used in the subsequent iteration. This process is continued until the attacker’s gain between successive iterations is within an exogenously specified parameter ϵ .

While *RSALA* is guaranteed to converge in finite time to the optimal solution, the strategy-space of the attacker could be extremely large, and solving the optimization problem 5 at every iteration of *RSALA* is computationally slow. This motivates us to create a heuristic approach, that balances between the quality of solutions and computation time of the algorithm. We call this approach **Adversary based Gradient Descent (AdGrad)**.

3.2 AdGrad : Adversary Based Gradient Descent

Convex likelihood functions that do not have closed-form solutions can be maximized using gradient-based approaches. Our problem is not as straightforward: attacker actions s affect the model parameters θ , but these actions are a function of the model parameters as well. We modify the standard gradient-based approach to enable the defender to take gradient steps that are based on the attacker’s adversarial actions. We present this approach in Algorithm 2. We use the same notation as in Algorithm 1, and denote the attacker’s decisions at iteration k by $s(k)$. At each iteration of gradient descent, we first calculate the best response of the attacker using the current parameters θ chosen by the defender (step 5). This provides us with an updated set of data with adversarial manipulations, which is then used by the defender to update its parameters using a standard gradient step (step 7). This process is repeated until convergence, using the same notion of convergence as in *RSALA*.

So far, we have described the overall idea behind robustness against spatial shifts in the context of incident prediction. Now, we dive into specific models, and apply this idea of robustness. We first show how robust incident prediction optimization problems can be framed for both continuous-time and discrete-time predictive models. Specifically, we present robustness in the context

of a Poisson regression model (count-based and discrete-time), logistic regression (binary response-based model and discrete-time) and spatial-temporal survival analysis (continuous-time).

Algorithm 2 AdGrad

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1: INPUT Dataset  $D$ , Likelihood Model  $f$ , Adversarial
   Utility function  $A$ 
2: OUTPUT Robust model parameters  $\theta^*$ 
3: Set  $\theta^0 \leftarrow \operatorname{argmax}_{\theta} f(x; \theta, w)$ ;  $k \leftarrow 0$ ;  $gap \leftarrow \infty$ 
4: while  $gap > \epsilon$  do
5:    $s(k+1) \leftarrow \text{Attack}(\theta^k)$ 
6:    $D^{k+1} \leftarrow \text{Update}(D^k, s(k+1))$ 
7:    $\theta^{k+1} \leftarrow \theta^k + \alpha \nabla f^{D^{k+1}}(\theta^k; x, w)$ 
8:    $gap \leftarrow f^{D^{k+1}}(\theta^{k+1}) - f^{D^{k+1}}(\theta^k)$ 
9:    $k \leftarrow k + 1$ 
10: return  $\theta^{k+1}$ 

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4 Robustness in Discrete-Time Incident Prediction

4.1 Count-based Model (Poisson Regression)

Consider that the total time in consideration in dataset D is divided into T time-steps. Let x_t^i be a random variable that denotes the number of incidents occurring at any time-step t in cell g_i . The likelihood model $f(x; \theta, w)$ therefore denotes the likelihood of x incidents occurring in a cell at a given time-step, where θ denotes the regression coefficients. In Poisson regression, the random variable of interest follows a Poisson distribution with mean μ , and $\mu = e^{\theta^\top w}$. Thus, the likelihood function for all incidents in dataset D can be represented as $F(x; \theta, w) = \prod_{t=1}^T \prod_{g_i \in G} \{\mu_{it}^{x_{it}^i} (e^{-\mu_{it}}) / (x_{it}^i!)\}$, where w_{it} denotes the features associated with cell g_i at time-step t , and $\mu_{it} = \theta^\top w_{it}$.

Attacker Model: Recall that incident $d_i \in D$ and ℓ_i represent the i th incident in our dataset and its location respectively. Further, N_i denotes the *neighbors* of cell g_i . We assume that the attacker could move to any of the neighboring cells to commit the crime, in order to evade detection. The spatial parameter s_j^i is a binary variable that denotes the attacker's choice to shift incident d_j to cell g_i . In our problem, the attacker's objective is to minimize the likelihood of the forecasting model by optimizing over the spatial decisions s . The attacker problem, using the likelihood for Poisson regression, can be represented as

$$\min_s A(s; \theta) \equiv \sum_{t=1}^T \sum_{g_i \in G} \left\{ \left(\sum_{j=1}^n \mathbb{1}(d_j, t) s_j^i \right) \theta^\top w_{it} - e^{\theta^\top w_{it}} - \log \left(\sum_{j=1}^n \mathbb{1}(d_j, t) s_j^i \right)! \right\} \quad (6a)$$

$$\text{s.t.} \quad \sum_{g_i \in N_{\ell_j}} s_j^i = 1 \quad \forall j \in \{1, \dots, n\} \quad (6b)$$

$$s_j^i \in \{0, 1\} \quad \forall g_i \in G \quad \forall d_j \in D \quad (6c)$$

where $\mathbb{1}(d_j, t)$ is an indicator function set to 1 if incident d_j occurred in time-step t , and is 0 otherwise. Constraint 6b enforces the natural bound that the attacker can shift one incident to only location.

Robust Poisson Regression Given the adversarial manipulations, the defender tries to maximize the likelihood of the learned model. Thus, the overall problem of robust incident prediction can be defined as

$$\max_{\theta} \min_s A(s, \theta) \quad (7a)$$

$$\text{s.t.} \quad \sum_{g_i \in N_{\ell_j}} s_j^i = 1 \quad \forall j \in \{1, \dots, n\} \quad (7b)$$

$$s_j^i \in \{0, 1\} \quad \forall g_i \in G \quad \forall d_j \in D \quad \theta \in \mathbb{R}^m \quad (7c)$$

We can directly use our algorithmic approaches to solve problem (7).

4.2 Binary Prediction Model (Logistic Regression)

Having looked at a count-based regression model, we now explain how our idea of robustness can be applied to binary models of spatial-temporal incident prediction. We choose logistic regression as our approach of interest, that models a binary output variable x through a logit transformation, such that $P(x = 1; \theta, w) = \frac{1}{1 + e^{-\theta^\top w}}$, where θ is the set of regression coefficients, and w represents an associated set of features.

We make some assumptions to use logistic regression in the context of incident prediction, as it models a binary response. As in Poisson regression, we assume that the total time under consideration is divided into T discrete time-steps. We further assume a granularity of temporal discretization that ensures that in each time step, only one incident occurs in a cell (essentially, we assume the response variable that measures the presence of crimes in a cell at a specific time step is binary). Such an assumption is actually reasonable for certain kinds of crime incidents (poaching in forests, for example), which are sufficiently displaced temporally. In the absence of adversarial manipulations, the likelihood of incident occurrence across

all cells over the entire temporal horizon can be represented as $f(\theta; x, w) = \sum_{g_i \in G} \sum_{t=1}^T \log(\frac{1}{1+e^{-\theta^\top w}}) x_i^t + \log(1 - (\frac{1}{1+e^{-\theta^\top w}}))(1 - x_i^t)$. The defender's objective without adversarial manipulations is simply finding $\theta^* = \operatorname{argmax}_\theta f(x; \theta, w)$

Attacker Model: As before, we denote the attacker's action space by the binary spatial parameter $s_j^i \in \{0, 1\}$, which is 1 if the attacker chooses to shift incident d_j to cell g_i , and 0 otherwise. The attacker's objective can be represented as

$$\min_s A(s; \theta) \equiv \sum_{g_i \in G} \sum_{t=1}^T \mathbb{I}(d_j, t) \left\{ \log\left(\frac{1}{1+e^{-\theta^\top w}}\right)(s_j^i) + \log\left(1 - \left(\frac{1}{1+e^{-\theta^\top w}}\right)\right)(1 - s_j^i) \right\} \quad (8a)$$

$$\text{s.t.} \quad \sum_{g_i \in N_{\ell_j}} s_j^i = 1 \quad \forall j \in \{1, \dots, n\} \quad (8b)$$

$$s_j^i \in \{0, 1\} \quad \forall g_i \in G \quad \forall d_j \in D \quad \theta \in \mathbb{R}^m \quad (8c)$$

where constraint 8b ensures that the attacker's shifts each incident only once.

Robust Logistic Regression Given adversarial intervention, the defender tries to maximize the likelihood of model after taking into account the potential spatial shifts by the attacker. The robust optimization problem can be represented as

$$\max_\theta \min_s A(s, \theta) \quad (9a)$$

$$\text{s.t.} \quad \sum_{g_i \in N_{\ell_j}} s_j^i = 1 \quad \forall j \in \{1, \dots, n\} \quad \forall g_k \in G \quad (9b)$$

$$s_j^i \in \{0, 1\} \quad \forall g_i \in G \quad \forall d_j \in D \quad \theta \in \mathbb{R}^m \quad (9c)$$

5 Robustness in Continuous-Time Incident Prediction

Now, we shift our attention to models of incident prediction that operate in a continuous-time domain. In this case, for each cell $g_i \in G$, we use the random variable X to denote the time between successive incidents, such that $x_i = t_i - t_{i-1}$ represents the time to arrival of the i th incident in the dataset. The goal of a continuous-time predictive model is to learn a distribution $f(x; \theta, w)$ over inter-arrival time between incidents, where θ represents the regression coefficients. Recently, survival analysis has been shown to have state-of-the-art performance for such problems, for example, in crime and traffic accident prediction settings [6, 19, 20]. A parametric survival model for a specific data point $\{x_i, w_i\}$ can be defined as

$\log(x_i) = \sum_{j=1}^m \theta_j w_{ij} + z$, where w_{ij} denotes the realization of feature j associated with data point i , and z is the error term, distributed according to distribution h . The particular choice of the distribution f depends on how we model the error term z . We adopt a common exponential distribution model for X , used previously in the context of incident prediction [6, 19, 20]. The log-likelihood of the observed data can be represented as $f(x; \theta, w) = \sum_{i=1}^n \log h(\log(x_i) - w_i^\top \theta)$. Given such a model for likelihood, the defender tries to find the parameters θ^* , such that $\theta^* = \operatorname{argmax}_\theta f(x; \theta, w)$.

Attacker Model: We assume that the attacker first observes the survival model f , and may shift to a different cell so as to commit a crime in an area with a smaller predicted crime frequency according to f .

To formalize the model, we introduce some notation. For each cell $g_i \in G$, let P_i to define possible successive (in time) pairs of data-points $\{d_k, d_l\}$ that could occur in g_i due to adversarial manipulation. We are specifically interested in successive incidents since the random variable we want to model is the incident inter-arrival time. We illustrate the idea behind such pairs in Figure 1. Consider the set of cells $\{g_1, \dots, g_9\}$ and incidents $\{d_1, d_2, d_3\}$, which we assume are ordered by their times of occurrences. Now, to look at adversarial perturbations in the dataset, we look at cell g_5 as an example. Incidents in its neighborhood that could move to it form the set $\{d_1, d_2, d_3\}$ (note that this includes d_2 since the attacker could chose to not deviate from the original location of the incident). This gives us three pairs of successive incidents, namely the set $\{(d_1, d_2), (d_2, d_3), (d_1, d_3)\}$. Observe that (d_1, d_3) is also a *potential* pair of successive incidents in g_5 since the attacker could chose to move d_2 to a different cell, which would result in d_1 and d_3 occurring successively in g_5 . Moreover, the pair (d_1, d_3) could exist as a pair of (possible) successive incidents if and only if d_2 moves to a different cell. In order to capture this, for any cell g_m and pair of incidents $(d_i, d_j) \in P_m$, we use B_{ij}^m to denote the set of all incidents $d_k \in D$ that could potentially move to g_m such that $t_i < t_k < t_j$. This lets us take into account the fact that d_i and d_j could occur consecutively in g_m if and only if they both move to g_m and none of the incidents from the set B_{ij}^m move to g_m . Finally, we capture the decision of the attacker to move an incident to a cell by the variable s_j^i , which is a binary variable that captures the attacker's decision of shifting d_j shifting to cell g_i .

We are now ready to present the attacker's problem. Let x_{ij} denotes the time between potential pair of successive incidents indexed with i and j . The attacker's objective is to minimize the log-likelihood of incident arrivals by introducing spatial shifts. This can be represented formally

as the following optimization problem:

$$\min_s A(s; \theta) \equiv \sum_{g \in G} \sum_{i, j \in P_g} s_i^g s_j^g \left\{ \prod_{d_k \in B_{ij}^g} (1 - s_k^g) \right\} f(x_{ij}; w_i, \theta) \quad (10a)$$

$$\text{s.t.} \quad \sum_{g_i \in N_{\ell_j}} s_j^i = 1 \quad \forall j \in \{1, \dots, n\} \quad (10b)$$

$$s_j^i \in \{0, 1\} \quad \forall g_i \in G, \forall d_j \in D \quad (10c)$$

A detailed explanation about the formulation can be found in the supplementary material.

Robust Survival Analysis The defender’s goal is to maximize the likelihood objective A over parameters θ . The resulting formulation is identical to that in Equation (7) for robust Poisson regression, with the likelihood objective $A(s, \theta)$ for the survival model the sole difference.

6 Experimental Evaluation

6.1 Data

We used the following real-world crime data from two sources -

- **Poaching data from Uganda:** We used data from the Murchison Falls National Park in Uganda, that covers 3893 sq. km. As the park covers an extremely large area, each cell is patrolled only a few times a year. As a result, we did not split the data temporally. We used 3 years of data for training, and 1 year of data for testing. For spatial discretization, we used a similar grid structure as with urban crimes, with square cells having sides measuring 1 km. We used geographic and terrain data, as well as past animal sightings as features. Patrol reporting in the park is done as a binary response, and we considered a total of 18255 reports, with 2602 of the reports being positive (evidence of poaching) and the rest being negative.
- **Burglary data from a metropolitan area in Tennessee, USA:** we considered 2184 burglaries from 7 months in 2014. Burglaries, to the best of our knowledge, are not *detected* by patrols, but rather reported. As a result, there is lesser chance of the data being contaminated by existing biases in patrol strategies. To further verify our approach, we created two overlapping datasets from 7 months of data, each with 3 months of data for training and 1 month’s data for testing. For spatial discretization, we used a grid consisting of equally sized square

cells with sides measuring 1 mile. We used risk-terrain data, past incidents, and weather data as features.

6.2 Setup

We use poaching data (marked only as binary response) to evaluate logistic regression and burglary data (marked with counts and exact time of events) to evaluate Poisson regression and survival analysis. We define neighbors for a cell based on its adjacent cells. A detailed description of our data and features is provided in the supplementary material. Our implementation can be found at <https://tinyurl.com/yc2uz7sv>.

We use models without accounting for adversarial interventions as our primary baseline. This has two advantages. First, it allows us to evaluate the efficacy of our algorithms on models that are not explicitly trained to be robust, and secondly, it lets us compare our approach with a baseline that has shown better performance than other state-of-the-art alternatives [6, 21]. We refer to the baseline models as standard survival analysis (SSA), standard Poisson regression (SPR), and standard logistic regression (SLR).

6.3 Results

Robustness — To compare the efficacies of the two algorithmic approaches, we begin by looking at how the algorithms *AdGrad* and *RSALA* perform on unseen data, and directly compare their performance to models that do not account for adversarial intervention. To do this, we introduce adversarial manipulations on our test data based on the attacker model described in section 2. We show the results on robustness for all the approaches using poaching and burglary data in Figure 2. In all the cases, we observe that both *RSALA* and *AdGrad* ensure higher robustness against adversarial manipulations than *SPR* and *SSA*. Also, as expected, *RSALA* outperforms *AdGrad*, since it is guaranteed to converge to the optimal solution.

Computational Time — Next, we present training times for robust predictive models. Training times for crime prediction algorithms can be a crucial factor in their deployment, as intervention strategies are often calculated periodically after each shift undertaken by patrols. We show our cumulative training times in Figure 3. As expected, we see that *AdGrad* takes considerably less time than *RSALA* to train.

Evaluating attacker’s budget — We also seek to understand the effect of the attacker’s geographic constraint (budget) on the robustness of the models. In order to do so, we vary the definition of “neighbors” that the attacker




Figure 2: Robustness measured by negative-log-likelihood on test set (lower is better) : (a) Logistic Regression (Poaching data) (b) Poisson Regression (Burglary data) (c) Survival Analysis (Burglary data)




Figure 3: Training time — (a) Poisson Regression (b) Survival Analysis (c) Logistic Regression

can shift to. We increase the attacker’s budget gradually; consider a crime in cell $g_i \in G$ and a budget of γ (say). Such a budget would enable the attacker to move to any cell $g_k \in G$, such that g_k and g_i have at-most γ other cells between them (a budget of $\gamma = 0$ reverts to standard models with no spatial shifts). With this notion of attacker’s geographic budget, we repeat the entire set of experiments. Our findings for the performance of varying attacker budget are consistent with our findings with using the immediate neighborhood of a cell as potential locations for shifts. Instead, we seek to visualize the predictions made by the forecasting models as we increase the attacker’s ability (i.e., as the criminals move farther away to commit crimes).

Specifically, we plot the spatial-temporal survival density learned by varying the attacker’s budget as heat-maps over the actual area under consideration. We generate the heat maps by predicting incidents across all cells for 3 days, and we repeat this procedure 50 times to reduce variance in the predictions. We show the resulting images in Fig. 4, that are generated by attacker budgets from 0 to 3. We see that as the attacker’s budget increases, the forecasting models become increasingly cognizant of potential crimes throughout the area under consideration, resulting in a spatial distribution of incidents that is spread out. An important insight revealed by this experiment is that a very high attacker budget can create models which essentially predict a high likelihood of crime occurring throughout the area under consideration, which is not necessarily useful in law-enforcement. Therefore, we point out that the attacker’s budget is a

crucial hyper-parameter in our models and recommend that system designers choose it carefully based on actual capabilities of the attacker.

Performance on non-adversarial data — While adversarial robustness of a model is considered solely in the presence of an attacker, it is important to evaluate the performance of the model on non-adversarial data. The very nature of robustness in our context dictates that we sacrifice performance on non-adversarial data to gain robustness against possible manipulation in attackers’ behavior. However, it is crucial to investigate the nuances of this trade-off. To understand this, we sort the total set of cells G according to frequency of incident arrival, and divide the sorted set into 10 bins. The first bin consists of cells with the lowest frequency of incidents, and so on. Then, we assessed the difference between predicted rates by standard models (SSA, SPR and SLR) and robust models (RSALA and AdGrad). To reduce variance in our approach, we evaluated the rate of incident arrival for each bin on 10 randomly chosen points in time from the test set. We present the results for Poisson regression in Figure 5 (our results are consistent across crime types and regression models).

We see that in order to gain robustness, our algorithmic approach underestimates incidents in cells with highest frequency. This reduction is a result of potential spatial shifts to cells with lower frequencies, on which our approach slightly over-estimates arrival rates than a baseline model. This is expected; in fact, this is precisely the behavioral change in attackers that we seek to cap-




Figure 4: Predicted incident density for incidents plotted according to a varying attacker budget. Images from left to right are plotted with an attacker budget of 0, 1, 2 and 3 respectively.




Figure 5: Difference in predicted rates between standard and robust models

ture. However, if our approach severely under-estimates the chances of potential crimes in cells with high frequencies, it could be potentially detrimental to policing strategies. We see that RSALA only underestimates frequency at cells with comparatively higher crime rate by about 0.04 incidents per hour to gain robustness. AdGrad naturally underestimates the frequency to a lesser extent, since it achieves lesser robustness.

7 Discussion

Broader Impact: There are several caveats to proactive law-enforcement that should be mentioned. Specifically, this area has faced numerous ethical issues in recent years [7]. Proactive deployment of patrols can be used to model possible environmental factors that are correlated with higher crime rates. However, there are two important factors that must be taken into account. First, crime data may already be contaminated by existing patrol strategies, and a bias in patrol strategy can affect outputs from algorithmic approaches. While this might not be an issue in fighting poaching, illegal fishing or logging in forests, it is certainly a matter of concern for crimes in urban areas. Second, any approach that aims to diversify the geographic spread of patrols increases contact of citizens with law-enforcement authorities. While this effect is a consequence of proactive strategies of designing patrols in general [22], it is particularly true for

approaches that seek to model robustness against possible spatial shifts. This work is purely focused on a methodological advance and our goal is solely to develop an algorithmic framework for robustness in spatial-temporal incident prediction. Our approach is motivated by specific applications such as poaching, illegal logging, illegal fishing, drug smuggling and human trafficking. Although not our primary motivation, the methodology we present can have implications for proactive law-enforcement in general. However, as pointed out by Mukhopadhyay et al. [7], proactive law-enforcement in urban areas clearly faces ethical challenges. We strongly recommend that practitioners carefully assess perception and expectations from such policies [22, 23], as well as its potential effects prior to deployment.

Conclusion: Spatial-Temporal incident prediction models have traditionally been agnostic to adversarial manipulations in agent behavior in response to learned models. We systematically bridge this gap by creating a principled nested optimization-based framework for predicting incidents that is robust to such manipulations. We frame the interaction between the defender and the attacker as a Stackelberg game, and propose two algorithmic approaches to solve the our problem. We show how our approach can accommodate both continuous-time and discrete-time (count-based as well as binary response-based) predictive models. To this end, we form optimization problems for accounting for spatial shifts in Poisson regression, logistic regression, and survival analysis. Finally, we use two real-world datasets to evaluate our approaches. Experimental results demonstrate that our approach is significantly more robust to adversarial manipulations than standard predictive models.

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